The Warfighters' Counterspace Threat Analysis (WCTA): a framework for evaluating counterspace threats by Douglas, Michael L. & Gray, Arlene J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2000-09
The Warfighters' Counterspace Threat Analysis
(WCTA): a framework for evaluating counterspace threats
Douglas, Michael L.











THE WARFIGHTERS' COUNTERSPACE THREAT
ANALYSIS (WCTA): A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
COUNTERSPACE THREATS
by
Michael L. Douglas and Arlene J. Gray
September 2000
Thesis Co-Advisors: Susan L. Higgins
Carl R. Jones
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
September 2000
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
TITLE AND SUBTITLE :




Douglas, Michael L. and Gray, Arlene J.





9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A
10. SPONSORING / MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
1 1 . SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
The authors present an evolutionary approach to evaluating the counterspace threat in support of Department of Defense (DoD) decision-makers.
The goal is to present a process that decision-makers can readily utilize to accurately assess the level of the counterspace threat originating within
their Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is particularly useful as the state of affairs change within the AOR. The authors examine the necessity to utilize
space to achieve information dominance, strengths and weaknesses of present Counterspace Threat Models, DoD's increasing dependence on space
assets, DoD's reliance on commercial space systems to meet future requirements, and potential adversaries' awareness of the dependence of U.S.
forces on space systems.
Conclusions stress that the threat is comprised of two essential elements an opponent's willingness to employ a counterspace tactic (their intent)
and the opponent's ability to develop the necessary tools to employ a counterspace tactic (their capability). The authors believe that the "intent'
component of the threat changes more rapidly than the present models can easily accommodate. Therefore, a process, such as the one presented in
this thesis, will enable DoD decision-makers that experience many of the changes of "intenf first hand to rapidly and accurately assess the threat as
the condition changes within the AOR.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Counterspace Threats, Counterspace Threat Assessment, Counterspace Threat Assessment Framework
















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
THE WARFIGHTERS' COUNTERSPACE THREAT ANALYSIS (WCTA):
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING COUNTERSPACE THREATS
Michael L. Douglas
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.B.A., The George Washington University, 1993
Arlene J. Gray
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Jacksonville University, 1992
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
I V I
ABSTRACT
The authors present an evolutionary approach to evaluating the
counterspace threat in support of Department of Defense (DoD) decision-
makers. The goal is to present a process that decision-makers can readily utilize
to accurately assess the level of the counterspace threat originating within their
Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is particularly useful as the state of affairs
change within the AOR. The authors examine the necessity to utilize space to
achieve information dominance, strengths and weaknesses of present
Counterspace Threat Models, DoD's increasing dependence on space assets,
DoD's reliance on commercial space systems to meet future requirements, and
potential adversaries' awareness of the dependence of U.S. forces on space
systems.
Conclusions stress that the threat is comprised of two essential elements
an opponent's willingness to employ a counterspace tactic (their intent) and the
opponent's ability to develop the necessary tools to employ a counterspace tactic
(their capability). The authors believe that the "intent' component of the threat
changes more rapidly than the present models can easily accommodate.
Therefore, a process, such as the one presented in this thesis, will enable DoD
decision-makers that experience many of the changes of "intent' first hand to
rapidly and accurately assess the threat as the condition changes within the
AOR.
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INTRODUCTION
A. JOINT VISION (JV) 2020
The goal of JV 2020 is to create a joint force capable of achieving full
spectrum dominance against the diverse challenges it will confront in the future.
JV 2020 describes full spectrum dominance as the ability of the United States
(U.S.) Forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and
interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across
the full range of military operations. Full spectrum dominance will permit U.S.
Forces to access and freely operate in space, sea, land, air, and information. JV
2020 resolutely pronounces that full spectrum dominance will be obtained
through the employment of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused
logistics, and full dimensional protection. JV 2020 definitions are provided:
Dominant Maneuver - the ability of joint forces to gain positional advantage with
decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo in the achievement of assigned
military tasks. Widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, amphibious, special operations
and space forces, capable of scaling and massing force or forces and the effects of
fires as required for either combat or noncombat operations, will secure advantage
across the range of military operations through the application of information,
deception, engagement, mobility and counter-mobility capabilities.
Precision Engagement - the ability of joint forces to locate, surveil, discern, and
track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the correct systems; generate
desired effects; assess results; and reengage with decisive speed and overwhelming
operational tempo as required, throughout the full range of military operations.
Focused Logistics - the ability to provide the joint force the right personnel,
equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity,
across the full range of military operations.
Full Dimensional Protection - the ability of the joint force to protect its personnel,
and other assets required to decisively execute assigned tasks. It is achieved
through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive
measures, within the domains of air, land, sea, space, and information across the
range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.
In addition, JV 2020 recognizes that the ability to employ dominant
maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional
protection in order to obtain full spectrum dominance firmly depends upon our
ability to capitalize on the information revolution. JV 2020 makes clear the
necessity to gain and maintain information superiority. Information superiority is
the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.
This capability is important because it creates the opportunity for U.S. forces to
achieve decision superiority. Decision superiority bestows U.S. forces the huge
advantage of being within an opponents decision making cycle.
B. PROMINENT ROLE OF SPACE
In this age of network centric warfare, the dependence on space by U.S.
forces has grown exponentially. Space has infiltrated all aspects of military
existence. U.S. forces utilize space systems to advance information in support
of myriad tasks such as meteorology, remote sensing, navigation, and
communication. Space systems have become essential in completing
operations ranging in complexity from directing smart bombs to ordering
supplies.
Space systems have become critical nodes. The ability of U.S. forces to
achieve information superiority and to ultimately gain decision superiority
depends firmly upon space. If the transformation of U.S. forces into a force
capable of achieving full spectrum dominance, as described in JV 2020, is to
come to fruition, the need to protect space systems from being negatively
effected by potential adversaries in crucial. U.S. forces must have sufficient
access and complete confidence in the information provided by space systems
to operate at maximum efficiency. The initial stage in protecting space systems
is to identify the capabilities of potential adversaries and assess the threat those
capabilities pose to U.S. space systems.
C. EXISTING COUNTERSPACE THREAT MODELS
In an effort to assess threats to U.S. space systems, several organizations
within the Department of Defense (DOD) have developed Counterspace Threat
Models (CSTMs). These models provide an intelligence community based
assessment of the ability of potential adversaries to negatively impact U.S. space
systems.
Existing models do an admirable job of delineating current and forecasting
viable future capabilities of potential adversaries. The models provide a solid
evaluation of conceivable threats. The information provided by existing CSTMs
validate the threat and provide critical feedback to research and development
(R&D) organizations within DOD. Existing CSTMs provide the insight necessary
to ensure that measures and capabilities needed by U.S. forces, to prevail over
current and predicted capabilities of possible adversaries, are developed.
Although existing CSTMs do an excellent job in support of R&D, the authors of
this thesis believe that existing CSTMs have inherent problems that limit its utility
to DOD decision-makers.
The first problem is timeliness. The results that are provided by present
CSTMs are based on information and considerations of the past. Developing
current CSTMs takes considerable time. From initiation to completion of a
CSTM, a great deal of time has passed and many factors may have changed. At
some point, however, developers of the CSTM must cease all new inputs and
release results. This approach is amenable within the realm of R&D, but may
pose a problem to DOD decision makers in search of current, accurate, and
timely information on which to base a precarious decision.
The next problem is rigidity of focus. CSTMs tend to be country oriented
and not readily adaptable to other possibilities. These models normally explore
capabilities of particular countries and do not easily adapt to analysis of smaller
or larger entities. This problem is of particular importance to DOD decision-
makers that may need to focus attention to an entire area of responsibility (AOR)
or a single element of an opposing force. The slate of potential adversaries to
U.S. space systems range from sovereign nations to terrorist groups. Future
CSTMs must be able to accommodate all possibilities.
The final problem is passivity. The models are generated by intelligence
organizations that disseminate results to customers. Models provide a matrix of
country-focused threats ranked as high, medium, or low. The CSTM does not
include DOD decision-makers in the evaluation process. This lack of
involvement invites DOD decision-makers to examine only the end result (the
matrix) and omit the supporting material. This approach does not foster an
environment from which a greater understanding of space is obtained. Decision-
makers will examine the final matrix without gaining a true regard for what it
connotes or for how it will ultimately impact their AOR.
D. PURPOSE OF THESIS
The authors of this thesis have presented an evolutionary approach to
evaluating the counterspace threat in support of DOD decision-makers. The
primary goal of this thesis was to develop a framework capable of providing an
accurate assessment of the counterspace threat within a given AOR. The
framework is flexible in design and will readily adapt to all future rivals. The
framework will encourage an improved understanding of space by providing the
guide from which decision-makers evaluate the counterspace threat within their
AOR.
The framework will enable U.S. forces to anticipate the impact of
counterspace tactics on the battlespace and to develop plans to compensate.
The framework provides decision-makers with the necessary tools and the
proper approach to accurately evaluate the ability of any foe to negatively impact
space systems within an AOR.
E. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
1 . Chapter II - Counterspace Issues
This chapter discusses the important issues related to
counterspace. It provides a historical perspective on space policy. It outlines
standing U.S. and DOD policy. It addresses DOD's increasing dependency on
space and makes clear that this fact is not lost to potential adversaries. Finally
the chapter explores the effect this dependency may have on counterspace
tactics.
2. Chapter III - Counterspace Tactics
This chapter introduces the elements of a space system. It defines
offensive counterspace tactics and delineates five major purposes of
counterspace. The chapter provides explanation of primary counterspace tactics
and presents the major strengths and weaknesses of each tactic.
3. Chapter IV - A Framework for Evaluating Counterspace
Threats
This chapter presents an evolutionary approach to evaluate
counterspace threats. The framework provides a top level step-by-step
approach to determine the threat. Each step is further defined to provide the
user with all necessary information to accomplish each step.
4. Chapter V - Research Methodology
This chapter outlines the major issues addressed within the thesis.
It illuminates the scope of the study and the rationale for the composition of the
framework. This chapter provides astute framework developmental information
that will support the user in adapting their particular operational situation to the
framework and achieve exceptional results.
5. Chapter VI - Conclusions and Recommendations
The summary and conclusion of this thesis are presented.
Recommendations for further study are also provided in this chapter.
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II. COUNTERSPACE ISSUES
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON SPACE DOCTRINE
In an attempt to gauge the counterspace threat, users of this framework
must discern that the threat is comprised of two essential elements. Those two
elements are the adversary's willingness and ability to utilize and to produce a
counterspace tactic. To gain improved insight on an adversary's willingness to
utilize a counterspace tactic, it is important to have a regard for the prominent
existing space doctrines. The four prominent doctrines regarding the utilization
of space are space sanctuary, lack of survivability, high ground, and control.
1 . Space Sanctuary
A basic tenet of the Space Sanctuary school is that the primary
value of space forces is their ability to "see" within the boundaries of sovereign
states. 1 Followers of this school of thought believe that space vehicles must
continue to enjoy the legal right of overflight.
If space vehicles do not have legal overflight rights, the possibility
of enforcing future treaties become murky. Countries will have essentially lost
the capability to conduct non-intrusive technical treaty verification. This doctrine
emphasizes that the ability to legally "see" within the borders of other countries is
1 On Space Warfare, p. 35, 1998.
crucial and the only way to protect this ability is to designate space as a
sanctuary.
2. Lack of Survivability
The basic tenet of the Lack of Survivability school is that space
systems are inherently less survivable than terrestrial forces.2 Followers of this
school of thought believe that space systems will be more vulnerable due to the
effect of long-range weapons and the intrinsic belief that nuclear weapon use is
more probable in space. It is also argued that the innate predictability of space
system location makes it an apt target.
Advocates of this school believe that space should be utilized for a
limited number of functions in support of U.S. Forces. These functions will be
utilized for increased efficiency in peacetime, but should not be depended upon
in a wartime situation because of susceptibility to loss.
3. High Ground
The basic tenet of the High Ground school is that domination of the
high ground ensures domination of the lower lying areas.3 This school of
thought advocates development of a space-based ballistic missile defense
(BMD). The development of a spaced-based BMD would offset the current
preeminence of offensive weapons such as directed energy or high velocity
impact. This would place defensive measures on even footing with offensive
2 On Space Warfare, p. 36, 1 988.
3 On Space Warfare, p. 36, 1 988.
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measures. The end-state would be to promote peace through the notion of
assured survival vice destruction.
4. Control
The basic tenet of the Control school of thought is that whoever
has the capacity to control space will likewise possess the capacity to exert
control over the surface of the earth.4 This belief is soundly founded in the
historical analogies of air and sea power. Espousers of this school view control
of space as the first objective in war. Control of space enables terrestrial forces
to benefit from the use of space while denying adversaries of those very same
benefits.
A fundamental understanding of these tenets is beneficial to the
users of this framework. The ability to associate an adversary to a school of
thought will provide crucial insight about the opponent's willingness to employ
various counterspace tactics. As stated above, one aspect of evaluating the
threat is gauging an opponent's will. This may be the more difficult task of the
two because it is esoteric.
B. U.S. SPACE POLICY
An understanding of U.S. and DOD space policy is conducive to the
proper use of this framework. The user must be cognizant of what actions
4 On Space Warfare, p. 37, 1988.
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present space policy issues, as appropriate. The user must also have a
comprehension of the purpose of present policy.
U.S. space policy is relatively straightforward. It espouses primarily the
sentiment of the Control Doctrine; however, it implies that the need for control is
only to ensure freedom of action, which is consistent with the Sanctuary
Doctrine. The policy states that consistent with treaty obligations, the United
States will develop, operate, and maintain space control capabilities to ensure
freedom of action in space; and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to
adversaries. These capabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal, or
military measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems and
services. The U.S. will maintain and modernize space surveillance and
associated battle management command, control, communications, computers,
and intelligence to effectively detect, track, categorize, monitor, and characterize
threats to U.S. and friendly space systems and contribute to the protection of
U.S. military activities. 5 The policy makes clear that any attempt to hamper or
limit U.S. utilization of space is considered unacceptable.
5 PDD-NSC-49/NSTC-8, "National Space Policy (U)," p. 1, 14 September 1 996.
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C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE POLICY
1. Purpose, Applicability, and Scope
DOD policy on space policy is outlined in DOD Directive number
3100.10. The purpose of this directive was to update policy from the 1987
revision that reflected the sentiments of the Cold War; to assign responsibility for
space and space-related matter within DOD; and to authorize publication of
additional DOD issuance.
It applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant
Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense Agencies, and
the DOD Field Activities.
The scope of this directive includes the policy, requirements
generation, planning, financial management, research, development, testing,
evaluation, acquisition, education, training, doctrine, exercise, operation,
employment, and oversight of space and space-related activities within the
DOD.e
2. Policy
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3100.10 is the requisite
authority on all DOD space related matters. It encompasses all issues related to
space from requirements generation to operation and employment. The
following are pertinent sections from DODD 3100.10 that relate to space policy
6 Department of Defense Directive 3100.10, "Space Policy," pp. 5-6, 9 July 1999.
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and counterspace tactics. These are themes the user must have cognizance to
achieve optimum results with the presented counterspace framework.
Space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be
conducted to achieve U.S. national security objectives. The ability to access and
utilize space is a vital national interest because many of the activities conducted in the
medium are critical to U.S. national security and economic well being.
Ensuring the freedom of space and protecting U.S. national security interests in the
medium are priorities for space and space-related activities. U.S. space systems are
national property afforded the right of passage through and operations in space
without interference.
Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an infringement on
our sovereign rights. The U.S. may take all appropriate self-defense measures,
including, if directed by the National Command Authorities (NCA), the use of force, to
respond to such an infringement on U.S. rights.
The primary DOD goal for space and space-related activities is to provide operational
space force capabilities to ensure that the United States has the space power to
achieve its national security objectives. Contributing goals include sustaining a robust
U.S. space industry and a strong, forward-looking technology base.
Space capabilities shall be operated and employed to: assure access to and use of
space; deter and, if necessary, defend against hostile actions; ensure that hostile
forces cannot prevent U.S. use of space; ensure the United States' ability to conduct
military and intelligence space and space-related activities; enhance the operational
effectiveness of U.S., allied, and friendly forces; and counter, when directed, space
systems and services used for hostile purposes.
These sections from DODD 3100.10 will support the user of this
framework to readily recognize what actions are and are not considered
permissible in accordance with DOD policy. This will benefit the user in
accurately assessing the counterspace threat.
D. THE INCREASING RELIANCE ON SPACE SYSTEMS
The reliance of U.S. forces on space to has grown substantially. Space
has played and continues to play a vital role in every military endeavor since
14
Operation Desert Storm. The Long Range Plan presented by U.S. Space
Command has recognized space as an enabler of military operations. It is
inevitable that space will become even more important in the future. For the
needs envisioned in the next decade, our already smaller military force will be
much more effective because of the information available to it.7
This concept amplifies the need for information dominance. Because the
size of U.S. forces continue to decline, information dominance becomes even
more of a necessity to achieve full spectrum dominance. Enormous amounts of
the information required by U.S. forces will be collected and disseminated via a
space system.
The necessity of U.S. Forces to utilize space to properly execute
operations, combined with the fact that space has been acknowledged as a
national vital interest in DOD policy, dictate that U.S. Forces must be able to
protect space systems and accurately distinguish the counterspace threat. The
military has basically followed the lead of the nation and shifted from an
industrial base to an information base. The way a nation makes wealth is the
way it makes war.8
This ever-increasing dependence on space systems may increase the
prospect that potential adversaries will take an asymmetric approach. During
this approach, opposition will focus on the development of niche capabilities.
7 U.S. Space Command, Long Range Plan, p. 1 , Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, 1998
8 Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, War and Anti-War, p. 2, Warner Books, 1993.
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They develop and use approaches that avoid U.S. strengths and exploit potential
vulnerabilities. The goal is to create conditions that effectively delay, deter, or
counter the application of U.S. Force capabilities by radically altering methods of
operation. 9 This is an approach tailor-made for counterspace tactics.
The growing dependence of U.S forces on space systems must be
properly managed and examined. U.S. forces can not allow its reliance on
space systems to evolve from an asset that enables operations to a vulnerability
that can be exploited. This is the principal rationale for developing a framework
that enables DOD decision-makers to evaluate the counterspace threat. If a
vulnerability exists, there must be a mechanism to identify it, so that U.S. forces
may adapt and overcome the disadvantage.
E. DEPENDENCE HAS OUTPACED BUDGET AND PRODUCTION
U.S. Forces dependence on space systems has and will continue to
outpace its budget and production capability. U.S. Forces are constantly in
search of opportunities to procure bandwidth. This has resulted in U.S. Forces
looking to the commercial sector to satisfy a portion of its requirements.
Because of the high cost associated with space systems and the declining DOD
budget, the number of commercial space assets is predicted to surpass the
9 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, p. 6, Washington, D.C., 2000.
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number of military space assets before the year 2010. Figures 1 and 2 denote
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Figure 2: 2010 Commercialization of Space (From NDIA 11 )
1u National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Space Study Presentation Brief, 1998.
11 National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Space Study Presentation Brief, 1998.
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that commercialization of space will continue to
surpass military production. In 1996, civil/commercial communications
accounted for 30 percent of all spacecraft. In 2010, it is projected that
civil/commercial communications will account for nearly 70 percent of all
spacecraft.
The share of military space system requirements that will be
accomplished through the commercial sector is expected to exceed 60 percent
of communications services and 30 percent of remote sensing services. Figure
3 summarizes the growth of military dependence on the commercial sector
through 2010.
100
2000 2002 2004 2006 2010
H Remote Sensing M RS Surge BUI Satcom M SatCom Surge
Figure 3: Military Dependence on Commercial Assets (From NDIA12)
12 National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Space Study Presentation Brief, 1998.
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Although the commercialization of space has definite benefits by allowing
U.S. Forces to leverage off its emerging capability and technology, it does
present interesting potential problems. One of the questions that needs to be
addressed is "What constitutes a U.S. space system?". Commercialization of
space has introduced a number of multi-national organizations. "Does U.S.
Forces utilization of these assets require that it be considered a U.S. space asset
that must be protected?". Another question is security: "How secure must these
systems be?". The final question is survivability: "Do these systems require a
more rugged design to increase survivability against enemy attack?". These are
all valid questions but not the focus of this thesis. Additional information on
these issues can be obtained from the National Defense Industrial Association
(NDIA) Space Study 1998, and GRC International, Incorporated's "The Next
Decade in Space."
This thesis is focused primarily on how these issues impact counterspace
threats. The problem commercialization of space poses for counterspace is two
fold. The first issue is that U.S. Forces are more dependent on commercial
systems that are more vulnerable. The second issue is that the
commercialization of space has provided potential adversaries with enhanced
information.
The issue of vulnerability of commercial space systems applies directly to
an adversary's willingness to employ particular counterspace tactics. If an
opponent is aware of U.S. dependence and the ease of degrading a commercial
20
space system, his willingness to degrade or disrupt the system will increase; and
therefore, the threat has increased.
The second issue of providing enhanced information to possible foes
pertains directly to U.S. Forces' ability to identify foreign capability. The volume
of information readily accessible allows potential adversaries to become more
familiar with U.S. capabilities and increases the ability to counter. For example,
commercially available 1 -meter imagery will increase an adversary's ability to
determine the location of U.S. space system ground segments. This information
would enhance the effectiveness of several counterspace tactics such as
Ground Segment Attack and Sabotage (GSAS) and Denial and Deception
(D&D).
F. ADVERSARY AWARENESS
The growing importance of space is not a phenomenon unique to the
United States. Countries throughout the world are increasing their awareness
and utilization of space. The reality that U.S. Forces are becoming increasingly
dependent on space systems is not a fact lost on other countries. The following
quotation is the perfect elucidation:
Counterspace operations are viewed as an inevitable aspect of future warfare
and as part of an overall information denial doctrine. Academy of Military Science
(AMS) writings note that the United States relies on satellite platforms for 70
percent of its communications (90 percent for navy communications), and 90
percent of its intelligence. Chinese strategists and engineers perceive U.S.
reliance on communications, reconnaissance, and navigation satellites as a
potential "Achilles' heel." COSTIND advocates believe China must develop
21
space combat systems which are a fundamental aspect of the revolution in
military affairs and a new sphere of warfighting. 13
It is certain that other countries are cognizant of U.S. Forces expanding
utilization of space. Potential adversaries view this reliance on space as a
liability that can be exploited. The accurate, timely identification of the threat will
enable U.S. Forces to anticipate the possible impact of counterspace tactics on
the battlespace and to develop plans to compensate.
13 Stokes, Mark A., China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, p. 1 17,
Strategic Studies Institutes, United States Army War College, September 1999.
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III. COUNTERSPACE TACTICS
A. DEFINITION OF A SPACE SYSTEM
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce an understanding of
what a space system encompasses. Counterspace tactics, means used to
exploit vulnerabilities in a given space system, will be defined. The researchers
will use the definitions presented in this chapter, as the domain in which the
space system and counterspace tactics will be used within the context of the
thesis framework.
2. Elements of a Space System
Space systems can be defined by a component breakdown of an
entire system. The researchers will work within using the space mission
architecture, as presented in Space Mission Analysis and Design 14 , as what
constitutes a space system. The following elements of a space system are
defined:
Subject- the thing which interacts with or is sensed by the space payload: moisture
content, atmospheric temperature, or pressure for weather missions; types of
vegetation, water, or geological formations for Earth-sensing missions; or a rocket or
intercontinental ballistic missile for space defense missions.
Payload- consists of the hardware and software that sense or interact with the
subject.
14 Larson, Wiley and Wertz, James, Space Mission Analysis and Design, pp. 9-1 1 , Torrance,
California: Microcosm, Inc & Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
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Launch System- includes the launch facility, launch vehicle and any upper stage
required to place the spacecraft in orbit, as well interfaces, payload fairing, and
associated ground-support equipment and facilities.
Orbit- is the spacecraft's trajectory or path.
Communications Architecture- the arrangement of components, which satisfy the
mission's communication, command, and control requirements.
Ground System- consists of fixed and mobile ground stations around the globe
connected by various data links. They allow us to command and track the spacecraft,
receive and process telemetry and mission data, and distribute the information to the
operators and users.
Mission Operation- consists of the people occupying the ground and space segments,
the mission operations concept, and attendant policies, procedures, and data flows.
3. Conclusions
The basic elements of a space system have been introduced so
that the user understands that the space system encompasses more than just a
satellite. Each of the components of a space system is vulnerable to attack.
Therefore, space systems pose a risk to operational commanders if a threat is
imposed on any components of a space system. The counterspace system
threat tactics will now be defined.
B. COUNTERSPACE TACTICS
1. Introduction
Once a definition of a space system is agreed upon, the tactics that
an adversary may employ to exploit any components of the space system must
also be defined for the purposes of this thesis. Offensive counterspace
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operations or "tactics" neutralize an adversary's space systems, or the
information they provide. These "tactics" are conducted through attacks on the
various elements of those systems for the purpose of achieving space control
objectives. These offensive counterspace operations involve the use of lethal or






Four broad categories of offensive counterspace tactics will now be defined and
used in the thesis framework.
2. Four Counterspace Tactics
The threat analysis framework being developed in this thesis will
use the primary counterspace tactics used by the National Air Intelligence Center
threat analysis model 15 . The four counterspace threats that will be used
throughout the framework are a) Denial and Deception, b) Electronic Attack, c)
Ground Station Attack and Sabotage, and d) Anti-Satellite Systems. Each of the
tactics will be defined with a brief explanation of their advantages and
disadvantages.
15 Threats to US Military Access to Space, pp. 3-6, National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
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a. Denial and Deception
The first counterspace tactic introduced is Denial and
Deception (D&D) Attack. D&D techniques are those tactics that can be used to
limit or corrupt information obtained by an intelligence collection satellite. D&D
can be employed by no directed and directed means. Non-directed means is the
routine employment of camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) to deny
or corrupt intelligence collected by satellites which may not be in direct response
to U.S. reconnaissance satellites. Directed means is the employment of
camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D) techniques to deny or corrupt
intelligence by satellites mainly during the overflight of a specific low earth orbit
intelligence collection satellite.
In D&D, potential targets include reconnaissance systems,
imaging systems, and other intelligence gathering satellites. D&D tactics are
relatively easy and inexpensive to employ and have the advantage of being able
to be conducted during peacetime situations. A disadvantages of using D&D
tactics is that the D&D program will only be effective if it is strictly adhered to by
all participants in their goal to limit or corrupt information. Because of this strict
adherence, it is necessary to limit the target set of this D&D counterspace tactic
to get better results.
b. Electronic Attack
The second counterspace tactic is Electronic Attack (EA).
This tactic is defined as functionally neutralizing a space system by jamming or
26
spoofing the electronic equipment on the satellite or at their ground facilities. EA
tactics can be used to disrupt communication, navigation, and data links within
the space system. EA techniques are moderately difficult to employ. Some
advantages of EA techniques are that they are inexpensive and have the ability
to effect multiple space system receivers. The disadvantage of EA attack is that
it is only effective while the EA system is being operated.
c. Ground Station Attack and Sabotage
The third counterspace tactic is Ground Segment Attack and
Sabotage (GSAS). This tactic employs physical attacks and/or sabotage against
critical ground facilities associated with space systems in an effort to disrupt,
deny, degrade, or destroy the utility of the space system. Any ground station,
including communications stations, data reception facilities, control facilities, or
launch facilities are potential targets. GSAS is relative low in difficulty to employ
and has the advantage of being essentially permanent in terms of damage to the
space system. Thorough knowledge of the target ground segment is essential to
employ this tactic successfully. Adversaries can employ this tactic, specifically
sabotage, in peacetime situations. Because of the visibility of destroying a
ground station, the employer of the GSAS tactic will likely be faced with negative
repercussions in the political world order.
d. Anti-Satellite Attack
The final counterspace tactic that will be defined is Anti-
Satellite (ASAT) Attack. ASAT systems are designed to exploit a number of
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susceptibilities to disrupt, deny, or degrade, or destroy satellites. All satellites
are potential targets. ASATs are often defined as soft kill (directed energy) or
hard kill (interceptor-based) systems. The advantages of using ASAT are that
they are effective when the ratio of ASATs to target satellites is low. ASATs can
permanently disable a space system. Because of the relative high cost of
employing this satellite, wealthy states are the probable users of this
technique. 16 Political realities dictate that employment of ASAT systems is most
likely to be done during or just prior to war.
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Table 1 : Counterspace Tactics Overview
3. Conclusion
The basis of the threat analysis framework being introduced in this
thesis will use the four counterspace tactics as described in this chapter. For the
16 U.S. Space Command, Long Range Plan, p. 3, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, 1998.
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purposes of this framework, the researchers have narrowly defined what each of
these tactics possesses as attributes. The relationship between all tactics in
their entirety has not been addressed. Each counterspace tactic will be
considered individually for their strengths in the ability to exploit vulnerabilities of
a space system. The four counterspace tactics: a) Deception and Denial, b)
Electronic Attack, c) Ground Station Attack and Sabotage, and d) Anti-Satellite
Systems are the backbone of the framework introduced in the next chapter.
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IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING COUNTERSPACE THREATS
A. INTRODUCTION OF THE WARFIGHTERS' COUNTERSPACE THREAT
ANALYSIS (WCTA) FRAMEWORK
1. Framework Purpose and Problem Statement
The purpose of this chapter is to present an evolutionary approach
to evaluating the counterspace threat. The framework presented, the
Warfighters' Counterspace Threat Analysis (WCTA), is a motivation oriented,
capability based approach. It is designed to be a step-by- step approach, which
guides the user through the proper methodology to accurately assess the threat.
The problem answered by this evolutionary approach is identifying the current
threat in the AOR based on the most recent events.
The framework limits the scope of the problem by presuming a
linear, independent relationship between the various counterspace tactics. This
simplifies the problem while still producing highly accurate results in support of
DOD-decision makers. The next evolution of the framework may explore the
interdependency of the various tactics and how it effects the AOR.
2. The Need for an Effective Counterspace Framework
The next generation CSTM must provide timely, accurate
assessments of the constantly changing threat experienced while operating in an
AOR. U.S. Forces need to have a near real-time assessment of the
counterspace threat. This point is extremely important because U.S. Forces
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must be able to readily identify a counterspace threat; thoroughly understand the
impact on the AOR; and effectively develop methods to counter.
The authors of this thesis believe that the only way to accomplish
this is to develop a framework that encourages an increased understanding of
space. The framework will accomplish this by allowing DOD decision-makers to
take an active role in evaluating the threat within their AOR. The user will gain
new insight on space while accomplishing each step of the framework. The user
will contemplate space-related issues, which effectively build the foundation
needed to fully understand the impact of counterspace tactics on the AOR. With
this enhanced understanding, DOD decision-makers will be better equipped to
make decisions on how to counter the threat.
3. Methodology
The framework is presented as a step-by-step approach to
complete the evaluation. Each step is further defined through comments,
examples, and figures to assist the user in properly accomplishing each step.
The framework is designed for DOD decision-makers to obtain an accurate
counterspace assessment based on the most recent and relevant factors within
the AOR. The reader is assumed to have a basic level of knowledge about
space, the AOR, and potential adversaries within the AOR.
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B. THE FRAMEWORK
1. Overall Framework View
The framework contains four top level steps, each containing one
or more substeps. The four top level steps are:
• Assess political reality
• Determine the required capabilities needed in each counterspace
tactic
• Evaluate the adversary's counterspace capabilities
• Determine overall counterspace threat.
Figure 4 provides an illustrative summary of the steps in the new
framework. Steps 2 and 3 must be accomplished for each of the four
counterspace tactics presented; however, the order in which the counterspace
tactics are completed is immaterial. The authors of this framework recommend
that once a counterspace tactic has been chosen, Steps 2 and 3 should be
completed consecutively for that tactic. Then begin steps 2 and 3 for the next
tactic to avoid confusion. The overall view presented in Figure 4 will be used to
examine each of the steps throughout the framework.
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Step 4 - Determine Overall
Threat to Space System
Figure 4: Warfighters' Counterspace Threat Analysis (WCTA) Framework
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2. Framework Steps
a) Assess Political Reality
The first step of the framework may be the most difficult to
accomplish. This step is difficult because people are accustomed to thinking in
specific terms, such as number of satellites. This step requires the user to think
in abstract terms. As discussed previously, threat is primarily comprised of two
elements, the adversary's willingness to utilize and their ability to produce a
counterspace tactic. This step addresses an adversary's intent or willingness to
employ counterspace tactics. Figure 5 summarizes this step.
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Figure 5: Step 1- Access Political Reality
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To complete this step, the user must evaluate the political
reality of the AOR and decide two issues. The first issue is what type of warfare
does the AOR most closely resemble. The second issue is what stage of conflict
is being experienced in the AOR.
Although wars are very diverse in nature and each war tends
to have unique qualities, the authors of this thesis have adopted the four images
of warfare presented in the article entitled "Which Way to the Future?,"
presented in the Summer 1999 issue of Joint Forces Quarter (JFQ). This article
provides an excellent description of four major types of warfare U.S. Forces are
likely to encounter in the future. The four types of warfare are depicted as
follows:
Systemic War - This image anticipates a future in which war will be fought with
missiles, precision-guided munitions, and space-based assets.
Cyberwar - A soft power image in which conflict is waged by combatants at
computer terminals. In its purest form, this image of future war does not see the
enemy being attacked with bullets and bombs. Rather, manipulation of information
suffices to inflict sufficient damage to bring about the desired end state.
Peacewar - Captures the ambiguities and shifting boundary between war and military
operations other than war. The prevailing image has soldiers, more or less equipped
as today, engaging in a range of low-intensity constabulary duties.
Dirty War - This image lies on the hard-powered end of the spectrum and is closer to
the systemic war image of high-technology warfare. Future conflicts will pit the U.S.
against a motley collection of non-state actors.
In accomplishing the first step of the framework (Step 1a),
the user must associate the political reality of the AOR to one of the above types
of warfare. Although every possible type of warfare is not addressed, the four
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images of warfare presented above do more than an adequate job
encompassing the nature of most conflicts.
Once the type of warfare has been identified, the next task
(Step 1b) is to determine the stage of conflict. In performing this function the
user must understand that stage of conflict embodies the vast range of
possibilities from peace to war. Stage of conflict does not consist of a mere two
possibilities (peace or war) but an infinite range. Sun Tzu described this best
when he wrote the following passage.
The master conqueror frustrated his enemy's plans and broke up his
alliances. He created cleavages between sovereign and minister, superiors and
inferiors, commanders and subordinates. His spies and agents were active
everywhere, gathering information, sowing dissension, and nurturing subversion.
The enemy was isolated and demoralized: his will to resist broken. Thus without
battle his army was conquered, his cities taken and his state overthrown. Only
when the enemy could not overcome by these means was there recourse to
armed force, which was to be applied so that victory was gained: in the shortest
time possible; at the least possible cost in lives and effort; with infliction on the
enemy of the fewest possible casualties. 17
The above passage eloquently clarifies the concept that warfare encompasses a
wide range of concepts. War does not necessarily require a declaration of war
or forces actually engaged in armed conflict. This is particular applicable to
operations U.S. Forces are frequently engaged in. U.S. Forces are called upon
to perform duties ranging from humanitarian relief to armed conflict. In an effort
to simplify the very complex question of stage of conflict, the authors of this
thesis have narrowed the spectrum to three choices: beginning, middle, or end.
17 Tzu, Sun, The Art of War, p. 39, Oxford University Press, 1963.
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This last part of this step (Step 1c) requires the user to utilize
decisions made above to obtain an available value for each counterspace tactic
from the political reality decision tree provided in Figure 6. The authors have
developed a political reality decision tree to assist the user in determining
available values for each counterspace tactic. These values reflect the
willingness of an opponent to employ that particular tactic based on the type of
















Figure 6: Political Reality Decision Tree
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b) Assess Required Capabilities for Each
Counterspace Tactic
Step 2 of the WCTA framework is to assess the required
capabilities needed in each counterspace tactic. This step is summarized in
Step 1 - Assess Political
Reality
i
Step 2 - Assess Required
Capabilities for Each
Counterspace Tactic





Step 4 - Determine Overall
Threat to Space
System









Factor of Each Capability
Figure 7: Step 2- Assess Required Capabilities for Each Counterspace
Tactic
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The first part, Step 2a, is to determine the list of required capabilities needed for
each of the four counterspace tactics being used in this framework. Figures 8 a-
d provides a template and a baseline list of required capabilities in each of the
counterspace tactics.
To complete Step 2a, the user must look at the given
baseline required capabilities lists and decide if there are other capabilities that
need to be included when studying a given AOR. New capabilities should be
added to the bottom of the list and numbered numerically. The researchers have
provided a means to add to the capabilities lists, which will assure that the
warfighter uses their own expertise in the subject matter, which will in turn tailor
the given framework to best suit the needs of the operational scenario. An
example of the use of the WCTA framework and each of its steps will be








































4 Physical attack assets
5 Any military assets
(include SOFs)















6 On orbit satellites
_
(other)
Figure 8c: GSAS Capability List Figure 8d: ASAT Capability List
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Step 2b requires the user to calculate the weighting factor of
each of the capabilities listed. For the purpose of this thesis, each capability will
be weighted equally within a given counterspace tactic. 18 To accomplish this
final portion of Step 2, count up the number of capabilities listed in a particular
counterspace tactic. Take this number and divide it into the value found in Step
1c, the highest available value of that particular counterspace tactic. The result
is the weighting factor for each of the capabilities listed in that counterspace
tactic. Annotate this result in the space provided in the capability lists and
repeat for each of the other three counterspace tactics. The following formula
and example are provided to guide the user through the given process:
r Highest Available Value in ^
Weighting Factor =
Counterspace Tactic (Step 1 c)
# of Required Capabilities Listed
V^_ in a Counterspace Tactic J
If there are six capabilities listed under a counterspace tactic, with a highest







1 8 Further explanation of capability weights will be given in Chapter V.
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c) Evaluate and Assign Adversary's Attained Threat Value
for Each Counterspace Tactic
In Step 3, the user must now evaluate his adversary and
assign an attained value to the threat that the adversary poses to the AOR. Step
3 has two substeps that are shown in Figure 9.
Step 1 - Assess Political
Reality
i
Step 2 - Assess Required
Capabilities for Each
Counterspace Tactic





Step 4 - Determine Overall
Threat to Space
System





a) Evaluate Adversary in AOR
and Determine Which
Capabilities Are Possessed






Figure 9: Step 3 - Evaluate and Assign Adversary's Attained Threat
Value in Each Counterspace Tactic
Step 3a is to determine what capabilities the adversary
possesses. Taking the capability lists developed in Step 2, the warfighter can
use these lists as a checklist and as a tool to determine what attributes the
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adversary under study possesses in terms of each counterspace tactic. To
complete this portion of Step 3, check all capabilities that apply to the adversary.
Step 3b is to give an overall threat value to each of the
counterspace tactics. The overall threat value of a particular tactic will be found
by first, counting all the possessed capabilities that the adversary possesses,
then multiplying that number by the weighting factor found in Step 2. The





# of Checked Capabilities x Weighting
Possessed by Adversary Factor (Step 2b
^ J
If the adversary possesses three of the six capabilities
listed, with each capability being weighted 1 .67, the overall threat value to that




3 x 1.67 = 5.01
This value will represent the total (highest available value that you can receive in
a particular tactic, as determined in Step 1c), or a portion of the available value
determined in Step 1c. In this case, 5.01 of 7 was given to the counterspace
tactic being studied. For the adversary under consideration, Steps 3a and 3b
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should be repeated for each counterspace tactic. Once there is a threat value
assigned to each of the four counterspace tactics, the warfighter can proceed to
the final step of the analysis to determine the overall threat posed to the space
system.
d) Determine Overall Threat to Space System
The fourth step of the WCTA Framework will determine the
overall space system threat in the given AOR. This final step is summarized in
Figure 10. Step 4 requires the user to utilize decisions made while working
within the framework, specifically values determined in Step 3 in each of the four
counterspace tactics, to obtain the overarching threat number for the whole
space system.
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System
Figure 10: Step 4 - Determine Overall Threat to Space System
In Step 4a, add all attained values of each counterspace
tactic (as determined in Step 3b), to get the overarching threat number for the
entire space system being evaluated:
D&D +EA +GSAS +ASAT = (Step 4a - Overarching Threat Number)
This overarching threat value should be between zero and 36.
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The final step of the entire framework, Step 4b, is to
compare the overarching threat number result to a given scale. This scale will
provide the warfighter with the needed tool to compare each of the adversaries
to each other. The given scale assigns relative quantitative assessments to
each adversary and is not meant as an absolute in comparing the threat19 .
Assessment of the counterspace threat is important due to
the possibility of hostile events, which could be initiated in an attempt to interfere
with or damage space system components within an AOR. The following are the
researchers assessments which are used to convey an evaluation of the total
counterspace threat within the given AOR. The total assessment takes into
account the political and technical realities of the adversary and evaluated AOR.
1 9 Further explanation of the relative values of this framework will be discussed in Chapter V.
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NO CONCERN MEDIUM HIGH
20 28 32 36
Table 2: Comparative WCTA Scale
NO (0-20) - In the judgment of the researchers, an attack against a space
system in the AOR is not likely.
CONCERN (21-28) - In the judgment of the researchers, events or technological
capabilities are available in this AOR that have raised the level of concern.
Further assessment is necessary in order to determine the nature of the political
intent or the lethality of the adversary's technical capabilities. Pending
completion of the in depth assessment, precautionary measure to enhance
responsiveness or survivability are suggested.
MEDIUM (29-32) - In the judgment of the researchers, an attack against a
space system may occur if political realities dictate or change to a higher state.
There is slight intent and the adversary is highly capable of inflicting damage to
the AOR's space system, affecting the space system and mission effectiveness.
HIGH (33-36) - In the judgment of the researchers, there is verifiable intent to
harm the space system.
C. CONCLUSION
This completes the use of the Warfighters' Counterspace Threat
Assessment Framework. Steps 1 through 4 should be followed to evaluated the
relative threat of each adversary in a given area of responsibility. This
comparative analysis will provide the warfighter with the most current and most
useful assessment of vulnerabilities to the space system under analysis. The




A. A NEW SYSTEMS APPROACH
The WCTA framework presented in this thesis is an evolutionary
approach to analyzing threat. The new systems approach20 of the WCTA has
several advantages that will increase warfighter involvement and make the threat
more comprehensible at the operational level. Some of the attributes of this new
approach are:
Representative of the whole system: the entire space system is taken into account,
not just the satellite vulnerabilities
Outsiders as participants: the warfighter is now involved in the threat analysis and
does not simply have to rely on intelligence reports
Balanced expertise: the framework allows for warfighter expertise to be included in
the analysis
Shared Power in analysis: Different results may occur from different analysts, but the
framework provides a route to identifying the differences and discussing them
Concurrent in Time: No time boundaries, results are of current political realities and
can inject current affairs
Iterative: Framework can be used many times on the same adversary to ensure a
comfortable analysis among the warfighters
Collaborative in design: Design does not have to rely on just one person, can have
collaborative analysis
Immediate Feedback: Framework is designed for ease of use and immediate results
Shared responsibility in analysis: The analysis does not rely on one level of analysis.
Analysis at an operational level may have advantages.
20 Roberts, Nancy. Course notes for NS4950, Wicked Problems, Naval Postgraduate School,
Summer Quarter, 30 August 2000.
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Further detail of the design of the WCTA framework will now be discussed in the
rest of this chapter.
B. REASONING BEHIND THE POLITICAL REALITY DECISION TREE
As discussed previously, the counterspace threat is comprised of two
basic components. The first component is the willingness of an adversary to
utilize a particular counterspace tactic and the second component is the ability of
an adversary to develop the capabilities necessary to utilize a particular
counterspace tactic. The authors of this thesis presented the four counterspace
tactics and provided insight about the advantages, disadvantages and ease of
implementation of each tactic. The decision tree directly addresses the question
of an adversary's willingness to employ tactics based on a three-phased
approach.
The first phase is based on the tactic in question. Some counterspace
tactics are relatively simple to implement and the utilization of this tactic would
have very little disadvantage or repercussion. For example, the counterspace
tactic of D&D is easily implemented and the utilization of this tactic would have
very little repercussions during peace or war. These factors increase the
likelihood that D&D would be implemented. The concept that some tactics are
more prone to be utilized has been incorporated into the decision tree by the
assignment of higher numbers across the tree for that particular tactic.
The next phase is based on the type of war engaged. The description of
each of the four types of future war adopted in this thesis was presented in
50
Chapter IV. The four images of future warfare presented all have particular
characteristics that advocate that some counterspace tactics would be more
acceptable and expected given the type of warfare. For example, if engaged in
Peace War, the use of ASAT would not be considered acceptable and expected.
Therefore, the employment of ASAT is probably not likely and the numbers
assigned within the decision tree reflect this belief.
The final phase is based on the stage of conflict. War progresses through
numerous stages and this has definite implications on the types of counterspace
tactics that will be employed. For example, the likelihood GSAS will be
employed at the beginning stages of war is more unlikely than at the final stages.
The decision tree incorporates this idea by assigning higher numbers to specific
tactics as the stage of conflict moves from beginning, to the end of conflict.
The authors of this thesis believe that it is imperative to have an
understanding of the reasoning behind the numbers assigned to the decision
tree. The decision tree attempts to quantify a very abstract concept, which is
adversary's will. The decision tree is designed to simplify a very complex three-
pronged problem. As the user becomes more familiar with the framework and
the underlying concepts, they will be able to refine the actual numbers assigned
within the decision tree to better meet the realities of their AOR.
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C. REASONS BEHIND THE REQUIRED CAPABILITIES LISTS
One of the main focuses of developing the WCTA was to give the
warfighter the option of being involved in the analysis of the threat poised to
space systems within their AOR. The capability lists are the second component
of the counterspace threat, measuring the ability of an adversary to develop the
capabilities to utilize a particular counterspace tactic. The space system threat,
to the counterspace tactics, to the listed capabilities, were developed with a
hierarchical structure in mind. Figure 1 1 gives a brief overview of the hierarchical
organization of the framework presented21 .
21 Powers, Darin L, Required Performance Parameters For Naval Use of Commercial Wideband
SATCOM, p. 22, Naval Postgraduate School, September 1998.
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System Effective Value (SEV)
Measures the degree to which all the functional objectives are met in the space
system. The goal is to use the SEV with adversary intent to determine the threat
to the space system. SEV = 2 (wiMOEi)
I
Functional Objectives
Are the offensive counterspace tactics that renders the space system
vulnerable. There are 4 of them and each one is reflected numerically as a
measure of effectiveness (MOE).
MOEs measure the degree to which the space system functional objective is
attained and MOE = I (wi'MOPrt
I
Measures of Performance
Are capabilities or attributes that identify and define a functional objective
(MOE).
The number of MOPs varies for each MOE.
MOPs measure the degree to which a critical characteristic of a functional
objective is attained.
Figure 11 : Hierarchical Organization of the WCTA
A baseline list of capabilities was developed using existing counterspace
threat models as a guide22 23 . These lists are attributes of the given
counterspace tactic and represent only the top level within that hierarchical level.
The researches did not try to analyze the capabilities individually, but assumed
the same level of effectiveness was equal in each required capability listed.
1. Level 1: System Effectiveness Value
The top level of this hierarchy represents the entire space system
threat. The threat is translated into a System Effectiveness Value (SEV) that is a
22 Threats to US Military Access to Space, pp. 3-6, National Air Intelligence Center, Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
23 U.S. Space Command, Joint Narrowband Concept of Operations, pp. 5-8, Peterson Air Force
Base, Colorado, 21 January 2000.
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weighted sum of all the functional objectives (measures of effectiveness (MOE))
and reflects the degree to which all the functional objectives are attained:
SEV =£ (wfMOEi)
wi = the weight of the I
th MOE
MOEi = the I th MOE that reflects the I th functional objective
The SEV is a relative (ordinal) scale score that is determined using
the given political reality. The final scale given in Step 4 of the framework
represents this given ordinal scale. It does not represent an absolute value of
the mission degradation of the threat; but rather, sets up a convenient way to
compare the attained threat value so an assessment can be made between
adversaries.
2. Level 2: Functional Objectives
Functional objectives make up the middle level of the analysis
hierarchy. For the purposes of this framework, the researchers have used four
offensive counterspace tactics within this middle level that include: D&D, EA,
GSAS, and ASAT. MOEs are the numerical aggregation of Measures of
Performance (MOP):
MOEj =1 (wfMOPj)
Wj = the weight of the jth MOP
MOPj = the jth MOP that reflects the Ith functional objective (MOE)
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3. Level 3: Measures of Performance
Measures of Performance are the lowest tier in the hierarchy.
Each MOP is grouped under a functional objective and directly related to a
counterspace tactic. For the purposes of this framework, we have used
"capabilities" as the equivalent of a measure of performance. For simplicity,
each MOP is weighted equally.24
24 Further research in this area will dictate the distinguishing features of each capability and will
force the user to weigh the MOPs differently.
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4. Summary
Figure 12 summarizes the hierarchical structure of the space
system framework being used in the WCTA:
System Effectiveness Value
(Space System Threat)








MOE 2 = sum (w2 *MOP)
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Figure 12: System Hierarchical Structure
D. FRAMEWORK STEPS AND ASSIGNMENT OF RELATIVE VALUES
In order to provide a framework that provides useful tools to the warfighter
to compare between different space system threats, relative quantitative values
were assigned to different decisions made within the WCTA. These values do
not represent any absolutes, but merely serve as a venue to comparing different
adversaries. Because the authors feel that the threat analysis takes into account
the intent of the adversary, it is realized that the final result may appear
subjective. This subjectivity is part of the design of the framework, because it
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adds to the discussion of why there may be different analyses of the same
adversary. The framework will lead the analysts to where differences lie. Upon
using this framework, the authors envision that the warfighters who use this
process will tailor the framework and quantify the different attributes using their
own justification. For the purposes of this thesis, the researchers have assigned
educated values for simplicity and ease of use of the framework. The following
table gives the intersection of where "intent" of the adversary may fall within the
given overall threat scale provided in Step 4.
Threat Level NO CONCERN MEDIUM HIGH












Table 3: Analysis Intersection of Political Reality and Overall Threat Figure
E. FINAL WORDS ON THE WCTA FRAMEWORK
The WCTA framework presented is not intended to be a one size fits all
assessment. What this framework does, is provide a step-by-step process to
evaluating threat when counterspace tactics are being employed by an
adversary. Much thought went into designing a framework that could be utilized
by any analyst from the enlisted to officer ranks. The design of the framework
incorporated ways in which the expertise of the analyst could be included into the
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final analysis of the threat. This tailorable process should be continued in all
areas of this framework. The use of relative values in the given framework
provide for the baseline for comparison among different adversary entities and
provides the groundwork to compare differing results by different analysts, if the
situation should arise. Analysts will be able to compare their work with others by
showing what decisions were made and what values were chosen to get the final




-sensitive to system design and political changes within AOR.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THESIS SUMMARY
In its current form, this thesis provides a basic framework to address
counterspace threats on a relative scale. The primary goal was to stress that the
threat is comprised of two essential elements: 1) an opponent's willingness to
employ a counterspace tactic, their 'intent' ; and, 2) the opponent's ability to
develop the necessary tools to employ a counterspace tactic, their 'capability.
The authors believe that the "intent component of the threat changes more
rapidly than the present models can easily accommodate. Therefore, a process,
such as the one presented in this thesis, will enable DOD decision-makers that
experience many of the changes of "intent' first hand to rapidly and accurately
assess the threat as the condition changes within the AOR.
In this thesis, the authors presented a framework for analyzing
counterspace threats to a space system that was designed:
-For the Warfighter
-For Operational Use.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
During the course of the authors' research, no other threat analysis
framework was found to exist for operational use to the warfighter. Continuing
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work in this area will be beneficial to U.S. military organizations as the country
adjusts to countering unknown entities or states of concerns. Related areas of
research include:
-Fidelity of Analysis (Conduct further research and analysis in the
interactions between the different counterspace tactics introduced in the WCTA
framework. Develop capability lists that accurately reflect different weightings
due to lethality and effectiveness).
-Mission Degradation (Incorporate mission impact into the design of the
WCTA framework. Include how counterspace tactics will affect operations and
offer counterspace defensive tactics).
-Automated Decision Support System (Use existing programs to
automate the WCTA process or develop an automated decision support system
that incorporates the WCTA framework).
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APPENDIX. ESPERANZA SCENARIO USING THE WCTA FRAMEWORK
Background
(Adapted from the Esperanza Scenario found in
http://www.teleoloqic.net/ISO/Journal/)
Five years of enthusiastic but largely ineffectual republican government
resulted in a conservative backlash and civil war in 1948. Contributing causes
included efforts to deprive the Church of its property, other land reforms
designed to break-up large land holdings in the high plains of Esperanza, a
significant reduction in the size and budget of the military, the prospects for
giving Altair internal autonomy, and an increasing communist involvement in the
government. In 1948 a Colonel Eric Fire, commander of the Coronado military
region, announced a revolution for "national restoration and the defeat of
communism." The Civil War ended in 1953 with General Fire and conservative
elements in command. General Fire began the first of what would become seven
six-year presidential terms. Fire ruled until his death in 1990, which precipitated
the nation's transition to democracy. Fire rebuilt the Esperanzan economy and
social fabric along conservative nationalist lines. He allowed the United States to
maintain air and naval bases in Esperanza, and developed the manufacturing,
tourist, and export agriculture industries.
In 1976 President Fire sponsored a new constitution which restored many
parliamentary features to Esperanza but was by no means a democratic
constitution. Half the members of the Parliament were directly appointed by Fire,
and the other half were elected through a mechanism of institutional
representation. While the cabinet was mostly civilian, it was a creature of the
President not the Parliament. The constitution also called for the restoration of
the monarchy. Legislation was passed during Fire's last two terms that called for
Prince John, son of the deposed King Paul, to become Monarch upon the death
of the President. Fire groomed Prince John for his future role as King, brought
him back from exile, and sent him to the Military Academy and then to law school
at Oxford.
The 1976 constitution established a supposedly secure position for the
National Movement Party, and enabled Fire to pursue a series of policies that
strengthened strategic industries and developed the infrastructure of the country.
The Railroad Revitalization Act 1978 and a variety of expenditures on highways
and airports characterized this time. Fire's special relationship with the United
States enabled him to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy, including actions
that led to the 1978 "Sardine War" with Franconia and several naval skirmishes
with Alerian gunboats over disputed maritime borders. Esperanzan nationalism
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under Fire did much to hide some basic problems that would come to the surface
after Fire's death.
During the 80s members of the National Movement Party began to take
advantage of their privileged positions and corruption ran rampant underneath
the nose of an aging Fire. Focus on strategic industries led to blindness
regarding basic social welfare issues that were hidden under the boot of an
authoritarian state. The detente between the United States and the Soviet Union
also made the military bases offered by Esperanza to be a less important asset
to the United States than they had been during the Cold War. American
Presidents began to focus on the authoritarian nature of the Esperanzan
government as opposed to their previous praise for Esperanza's staunch anti-
Communist policies.
When Fire died in 1990, the stable transition he envisioned was disrupted
by the hierarchy of the National Movement Party. Fearing the Prince's purported
liberal tendencies, the party leaders attempted to postpone his coronation
indefinitely through the mechanism of a Party-organized regency. This move by
a party widely reviled as corrupt and bloated led to popular demonstrations
across the country in support of the Prince. The Spring of 1991 , as this
outpouring of support for Prince John came to be called, resulted in a
confrontation between the armed services and the National Movement when the
Civil Guard and Army refused to fire upon protesters. Rather than be deposed by
an irate military, the National Movement regency made arrangements for the
coronation of Prince John in January of 1992.
King John Patroclus IV began his reign approving legislation that legalized
independent trade unions, political parties, and political expression. He then
dismissed the Parliament and reconvened it with a diverse cadre of influential
and powerful Esperanzans. The 1993 constitution emerged from this gathering,
and Esperanza was set on the path of becoming a constitutional monarchy.
The first election under this constitution had a not unsurprising result.
After years under political conservatives, the people voted in masses for left wing
candidates. The Socialists, under Gregor Mendoa formed a governing coalition
and went about attending to issues of social welfare, education and
environmental protection, which had been neglected for so long under the
National Movement.
During Mendoa's regime, the Esperanzans signed various international
agreements regarding the environment including the Biodiversity and the Endangered
Species Agreements. Mendoa's regime failed to attend to issues of fiscal responsibility
and three years of negative economic growth promised to make this a nagging problem
for the Socialists. The innovative solution they proposed to remedy this problem,
autonomy for the various provinces of Esperanza, was the undoing of the Mendoa
government.
Mendoa proposed experimenting with autonomy for Altair. Mendoa
argued that smaller economies could be more efficiently organized under
socialist principles. Conservative forces and the average Esperanzan heard the
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death knell of a greater Esperanza in this proposal. King John called for a
referendum on this vital issue and the result was a resounding defeat for
Mendoa's Socialists, though not for Esperanzan democracy. Andrew Aranda's
Centrist Convergence Party was able to sweep the field on the basis of an
argument for the liberalization of the Esperanzan economy and a localization of
governance without the divisions conjured up by the vision of autonomous
provinces. The Agrarians and the Republica Esperanza joined Aranda's party to
form today's governing "national unity" coalition.
Aranda's coalition faces many problems. They must find a way to balance
the budget, lower unemployment, improve the balance of trade, maintain the
support of the military, and prevent divisive forces from pulling Altair away from a
greater Esperanza. The rejection of Altairian autonomy has inspired Land and
Liberty, a radical Altairian separatist movement to launch a campaign of terror.
This radicalism has in turn strengthened the conservatives including the
reactionary League of Honor. The diverse nature of Esperanza's population
makes the successful handling of the issue of provincial minorities central to the
success of any government seeking to preserve Esperanzan democracy.
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Facts and Figures on The Kingdom of Esperanza
Area:
total: 504,000 sq. km
Area-comparative:
Slightly more than twice the size of
Oregon
Maritime claims:
Long-term dispute with Latia regarding
shared maritime border; fishing rights
disputes with Franconia related to waters
north of the Celtan Islands; ongoing




mild temperate; cool, cloudy, wet winters;
hot, clear, dry summers; interior is cooler
and dryer.
Terrain:
Esperanza constitutes most of a
continental peninsula. The peninsula is
defined by the ocean and Hieronmite
Mountains to the West, the Bay of Altair
and Tannus River in the North, the Pindus
Mountains to the east, and the lllurian
Sea to the South. Between the
Hieronomite and Pindus Mountains the
terrain is divided between the high
Coronado Plateau and the gently
descending alluvial hills of the Valdez and
Tannus River watersheds.
Elevation extremes:
lowest point: Sea Level 0m
highest point: Mount Alta 4006m
Natural resources:


















9.73 births/1 ,000 population
Death rate:




at birth: 1 .07 male(s)/female
under 15 years: 1 .06 male(s)/female
75-64 years: 1 male(s)/female
65 years and over: 0.71 male(s)/female
(1998 est.)
Infant mortality rate:
6.51 deaths/1,000 live births (1998 est.)
Life expectancy at birth:
total population: 77.56 years
male: 73.78 years
female: 81 .59 years (1 998 est.)
Total fertility rate:





Esperanzan 65%, Altarian 20%, Brasan
10%, Latian5%,
Religions:
Roman Catholic 70%, Muslim 15%,




deforestation; soil erosion; water pollution
from industrial and domestic effluents
Environment-international
agreements:
Air Pollution, Air Pollution-Nitrogen




Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Nuclear









Parliamentary Monarchy (in transition










Based on Napoleonic Code
Suffrage:









A nascent high technology industry
appears to be developing around the U.S.
Air Force base thirty miles northwest of
Pireus, but per capita income in Southern
Esperanza remains about 60 percent of
that in the industrial North. Yet Southern
Esperanza's economy is sufficiently more
robust than that of neighboring Brasas
that the migration of "temporary workers"
from that nation has served to keep wage
increases modest. In recent years,
military spending has become an issue
with pensioners and the military itself
beginning to drain government coffers.
Esperanza ran a deficit in 1 996 and has
done so for the past 3 years.
GDP:











Head of state: King John Patroclus IV
Inflation rate-consumer price index:
2.1%
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(since 1 992)Head of government: Prime
Minister Andrew Aranda (since 1998)
Council of Ministers: Named by monarch
in consultation with the Prime Minister
Legislative branch:
Senate, consisting of 220 members
elected to serve three year terms (last
election 1998). All legislation originates in
the Senate; and Council of State,
consisting of approximately 25 members
who serve at pleasure of the Monarch,
must affirm Senate legislation or may
return legislation to Senate with
recommendations for improvement.
Legislation may be returned to Senate by
Council of State up to three times over a
period of two years.
Judicial branch: Five-member Supreme
Court, judges are appointed by the
Monarch
Political parties:
Socialist (35 Senators), Christian
Democrats (18 Senators), Republica
Esperanza (32 Senators), Centrist
Convergence (84 Senators), Agrarian (21
Senators), National Restoration (15




Esperanza has a mixed capitalist
economic system with some unique
peculiarities,the most notable a
constitutionally mandated 7% GDP
expenditure on the military. Estimates for
military income range between 3-5% of
GDP, still short of their 7% mandate. The
government controls the majority of
transportation, communications,
electricity and about 60% of a well-
developed durable goods manufacturing
system. The manufacturing sector is
largely concentrated in a crescent running
from Altair in the North to Neuvilla in the
South and extending along the River
Tannus (border with Franconia).The
mining industry, concentrated in the
northeastern mountains, has been able to
Labor force:
total: 13.2 million
by occupation: services 20%,
manufacturing, mining, and construction





expenditures: $139 billion, including
capital expenditures of $15 billion (1995)
Industries:
textiles and apparel (including footwear),
food and beverages, metals and metal
manufactures, mining, chemicals,
weapons, durable goods, machine tools,
Industrial production growth rate:
0.8% (1996)
Electricity-capacity:
39.583 million kW (1995)
Electricity-production:




grain, vegetables, olives, wine grapes,
sugar beets, citrus; beef, pork, poultry,
dairy products
Exports:
total value: $94.5 billion
commodities: semifinished manufactured
goods, foodstuffs, machinery, ores,
Imports:
total value: $98.3 billion
commodities: machinery, transport
equipment, fuels, semifinished goods,





remain out of the hands of the
government and employs nearly 20% of
the population. Rich deposits of coal,
nickel, cobalt, copper, and timber have
helped place Esperanza in a highly
competitive position in the mining
industry. Beef from the high plateau of
Central Esperanza and wine from the
coastal region of Pireus are also sources
of export revenue and national pride.
Over the last 1 5 years there has been
significant attention to building the tourist
industry along the beaches of Pireus
Province and the Pindus Mountains of
Southeastern Esperanza.





15.6 million (1990 est.)
Telephone system:
generally adequate, modern facilities
domestic: NA
international: 22 coaxial submarine
cables; satellite earth stations-2 Intelsat
(1 Atlantic Ocean and 1 Indian Ocean),
NA Eutelsat, NA Inmarsat, and NA
Marecs; tropospheric scatter to adjacent
countries
Radio broadcast stations:
AM 190, FM 406 (repeaters 134),
shortwave
Radios:
5 million (1992 est.)
Television broadcast stations:
1 00 (repeaters 1 ,297)
Televisions:
8.7 million (1992 est.)
Military branches:
Army, Navy Air Force, Civil Guard,
National Police.
Military manpower-military age:
1 8 years of age
Military manpower-availability:
males age 15-49: 8,987,539 (1998 est.)
Military manpower-fit for military
service:
males: 8,369,756 (1998 est.)
Military manpower-reaching military
age annually:
males: 323,552 (1998 est.)
Military expenditures-dollar figure:
$9.4 billion (1995)








Latia has never recognized the legitimacy
of the Esperanzan occupation of the lliki
River Valley (1879), but there has been
no active effort by Latia to reclaim this
67
total: 144,847 km
paved: 141,399 km (including 7,747 km
of expressways)
unpaved: 3,448 km (1996 est.)
Waterways:
545 km but of minor economic
importance
Pipelines:
crude oil 265 km; petroleum products





over 3,047 m: 15
2,438 to 3,047 m:7
1,524 to 2,437 m: 6
914 to 1,523 m: 8
under 914 m: 9 (1 997 est.)
Heliports: 8 (1 997 est.)
territory since a failed mediation effort in
1 905. Esperanzan and Alerian gunboats
have exchanged occasional fire, but
sustained no damage, in an ongoing
dispute regarding their maritime border.
This issue has, however, been
complicated recently by the identification
of undersea oil reserves in the boundary
zone. In 1976 a so-called "Sardine War"
briefly flared in the Bay of Altair as
Esperanzan and Franconian naval forces
sought to enforce disputed fishing zones.
The issue is currently before the
International Court of Justice, but joint
fishing has proceeded without incident
since 1978. The 1902 International
Covenant recognizing the independence
of Brasa was ambiguous regarding the
status of the region southwest of the
Praxis River, but this region has been
consistently occupied by Esperanza and
Brasa has undertaken no formal
diplomatic measures to clarify the
ambiguity, though it remains an
occasional cause for friction in bilateral
relations. Right-wing parties in Esperanza
continue to call for reintegration with
Brasa, but since 1 902 no Esperanzan








THE KINGDOM OF ESPERANZA CIVIC COMPOSITION
The earliest recorded human institution in Esperanza was the Council of
Pireus (circa 440 BC), the governing body of the Latian commercial colony
located near the modern city of the same name. During the late Medieval period
a dense fabric of institutional structures emerged, including municipal councils,
commercial guilds, feudal fiefs, Catholic parishes and dioceses, Muslim
administrative regions, and, over-time, the various instruments of centralized
royal administration. Some of these institutions continue unto the present day. In
the 1th Century traditional political and cultural institutions were supplemented by
a new kind of economic institution focused less on specific trades than on major
financial sectors.
The following provides brief summaries of the principal governmental,
economic, and cultural institutions of modern Esperanza with a focus on the last
half-century. Political parties, while clearly important, are not summarized. Since
1990 the political situation has been so fluid that it would be largely inaccurate to
perceive any of the political parties as sufficiently stable to constitute an
"institution." Even the Agrarian Party, established over 100 years ago, would
today be unrecognizable to its founders.
Political Institutions
The Monarchy - Claiming direct descent from Prince Alexander Patroclus,
recognized by the Sultan of Aleria as King of Crotona in 982 AD, the royal family
is actually of a highly cosmopolitan historical and ethnic background. The current
dynasty is principally of Nordic heritage and was introduced to Esperanza in
1712. The monarchy as an institution has been significantly influenced by the
pattern of the Avadorres Regency (1876-1894) regarding which the current King
has been a serious student.
The Monarch is recognized as the "personalization" of the nation's
sovereignty, and in his or her (the 1993 Constitution allows female succession)
hands are concentrated all political authority. By law this political authority is
delegated to other institutions of the state. By recent practice, this delegation of
authority is substantive and not liable to review or revision by the monarch. But
legal scholars argue that the Esperanzan monarch is, de jure, an absolute
sovereign, even though practice and political reality has significantly limited the
Monarch's de facto political decision-making. For example, to date the current
King has not used the power of legislative veto explicitly granted in the
Constitution.
The Monarchy maintains its own bureaucracy, separate from that of the
government. The Royal Administrative Office is headed by a Lord Chamberlain,
and consists of a Household Office, a Calendaring Office, a Logistics Office, a
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National Security Office, a Legal Office, and a Research Office that operates as
a kind of in-house think-tank.
The Council of State - The 1993 Constitution created a Council of State of
indeterminate size. The current King has generally maintained a Council of
approximately twenty-five members. The Council must affirm and register laws
adopted by the Senate. It may return laws to the Senate with recommendations
for improvement up to three times in a period of two years. This power of delay is
seen as an important check on any government's excessive focus on the near-
term. Constitutional Amendments must be approved by the Council of State.
Laws which are registered by the Council of State without the signature of the
King are termed "legate in concilium" and may be reviewed and overturned by
the courts on constitutional grounds. The King's signature creates a "legate ex
cathedra" (from the throne) and may not be reviewed by the courts. Since
assuming the throne the King has signed only one piece of legislation, that one
focusing on the rights of free association. Meetings are chaired by a Lord
President of the Council or by the Monarch. The current King has appointed both
of his Prime Ministers to the Council, as well as other selected members of the
cabinet. Prime Minister Mendoa is likely to have established a precedent when
he resigned from the Council of State when his party lost the 1998 election.
Members of the Council serve at the pleasure of the Monarch. In the case of a
succession where the monarch is under age 25 the Council of State serves as a
Regency Council.
Meetings of the Council of State are held in private. The minutes of its
proceedings are limited to motions and formal actions. There is no record of the
discussions held. There is an opulent room in the SanLucar Palace reserved for
meetings of the Council of State. The Council has also convened at other
locations.
The Senate - The 220 Senators are elected from districts of approximately
equal population. The Senate House was built during the Avadorres Regency
specifically to host an assembly of the people. The structure features a debating
chamber that can accommodate nearly 300 and large public galleries. In a fairly
unusual feature of modern parliaments, the Senators are seated by provincial
rather than political allegiances. A semi-circle of small desks and chairs are
arranged from left to right for delegations from the Isla de Sol, Montaigne, Altair,
Monterey, San Lorenzo, Nord de Riv, Crotona, and Leponto.
In addition to elected representatives, the Monarch, Heir Apparent, Lord
Chamberlain, Lord President of the Council of State, provincial Chief Ministers,
and members of the cabinet who are not Senators are also recognized as
members of the body with full rights to the floor and participation in debates, but
without voting privileges.
The Senate elects from its membership a Tribune who serves as Chair.
The Tribune only votes in case of a tie, but has the power to name Senators to
committees and appoint special committees. Senate Committees are typically
the principal source of legislation. There are currently ten committees.
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1.
Committee on Agriculture, Commerce, Fisheries, Mining, and
Industry
2. Committee on Banking, Finance, and Treasury Affairs
3. Committee on the Budget and Taxation
4. Committee on Defense and Military Affairs
5. Committee on Education, Culture, Health and Social Welfare
6. Committee on Foreign Affairs
7. Committee on Internal Security
8. Committee on Justice and the Judiciary
9. Committee on Transportation and Public Works
10. Committee on Senate Organization and Agenda
The Committee on Senate Organization and Agenda is, by practice,
identical to the cabinet, and in this form has the authority to refer legislative
proposals to committees and set the agenda for Senate action.
The Government-The monarch names the head of government,
presumably from the Party capable of organizing a majority in the Senate. A
majority of the Senate is required to vote to confirm the head of government
selected by the monarch. The head of government is formally known as the Lord
Chancellor, but more usually as the Prime Minister or Premier. Ministers of the
government departments are also officially named by the Monarch, but since
1992 have been chosen by the Prime Minister from among various party leaders.
The Cabinet consists of Ministers, Secretaries of State, the Procurator-
General, the Lord Chamberlain, and the Heir Apparent (when over age 18). The
current members of the Cabinet, in order of precedence, are:
• The Lord Chancellor (Prime Minister): Andrew Aranda, (Center
Convergence)
The Lord Chamberlain, The Marquis of Sully, (non-partisan)
The Minister of Justice and Procurator-General: Oswaldo Jameson,
(Center Convergence)
The Minister of Foreign Affairs: Count Monte'Oro, (Republica Esperanza)
The Minister of Defense, Philip Salvadore, (Center Convergence)
The Minister of Finance and Lord Treasurer: Joseph Monino, (Agrarian)
The Minister of the Interior: Edward Squillaci (independent)
The Minister of Education, Culture, and Science: Ferdinand River,
(Republica Esperanza)
Secretary of State for Health and Social Welfare: Maria Fisher (Center
Convergence)
Secretary of State for International Trade: Mark Grimaldi, (Agrarian)
Secretary of State for Public Works: Nicholas Kyriodas., (Center
Convergence)
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• Secretary of State Economic Development: Adrian Santerre (independent)
KINGDOM OF ESPERANZA MILITARY COMPOSITION
Throughout Esperanzan history the military has played a critical role in
national political life. Since the emergence of a professional military in the early
19th Century, soldiers have regularly been courted by politicians of every
ideological stripe. The officer corps, especially in the Army, has typically been
conservative in its social and political worldview. When military discipline has
been well maintained, the rank and file has generally followed its officers. Military
embarrassments have often been the impetus for political reform.
It is somewhat paradoxical that the military bequeathed to Esperanza upon
the death of President Fire may be the most professional and non-ideological in
the history of the state. While President (formerly General) Fire was perceived
outside Esperanza as the leader of a military coup in 1948, he came to view
himself more as a social and spiritual leader rather than a military leader. As a
result, since at least the late-1960s, military education has focused on the
profession of arms and obedience to civilian authority. The most dramatic
evidence of this was the refusal of military leaders to support the National
Movement's effort to delay the coronation of King John.
But even so, the military as an institution, remains self-conscious of a
"special" role it plays in preserving and advancing national unity. It is the only
Esperanzan institution that truly transcends regional, religious, and socio-
economic divisions. There is also a strong sense of institutional self-preservation
on the part of the Military. Access to budget, opportunities for promotion, and
engagement in prestigious assignments are the focus of significant intra-
institutional energies. While the three military services and the para-military Civil
Guard share many institutional characteristics, they are also unique and
competitive.
The Army is the largest of the military branches, with a roster outnumbering
all other branches taken together. In 1998 the Army consisted of nearly 80,000
troops. The organizational structure consists of four regionally-based Divisions
commanded by Captain-Generals. Each division is made up of four or more
brigades of approximately 5000 troops each. Regiments of approximately 1000
troops are typically made up of three or four battalions.
The most prestigious commands are the so-called "Old Guard" infantry
regiment, closely associated with royal protection; the paratroop regiment; and
four armored regiments. Most Army officers, and all general officers, are
graduates of one or more of three elite military educational institutions. The
College of Arms is the undergraduate military school founded in 1 748. The Royal
Institute of Artillery, despite its name, is a school for senior staff officers. Both of
the foregoing institutions give significant attention to the creation of a shared
Army culture and close relations between members of the Army officer corps.
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The Joint Defense University was founded in 1 972 to provide advanced study in
strategy and technology for all military branches.
The King is Commandant-General of the Army and has the rank of Marshal.
He is a graduate of the Royal Institute of Artillery and has good personal
relations with a cross-section of officers in his generation. The most senior Army
officers promoted under the Fire regime are approaching retirement age. They
are among the last with personal memories of direct military involvement in
political affairs.
The Navy is organized in four squadrons, the Celtic Islands Squadron based
in Saint Sebastian, the Bay of Altair Squadron based in Altair, the lllyrian Sea
Squadron based in Pireus, and the Coastal Defense Squadron, headquartered in
Saint Jerome, but deployed widely along the coasts. Each squadron consists of
15 to 25 ships and submarines and 3000 to 4000 officers and sailors. Each
squadron also hosts a 1 000 troop regiment of Marines which are used for
amphibious operations and base security.
Only about a quarter the size of the Army, the Royal Navy is even more
diverse than its larger institutional partner. Less affluent Latians and Alatarians
have traditionally found the Navy well-suited to upward mobility and small-town
boys from the high plains of central Esperanza have seen the Navy as the path
to adventure.
The command philosophy of the navy tends to focus on individual ships
rather than integrated squadrons, which has produced a fairly non-hierarchical
culture, at least in comparison with the Army. There are generally no more than
six Admirals on active-duty. The list of naval captains was only 112 names long
in 1998. The intimacy of the naval community is also reinforced by a requirement
for all officers above Lieutenant-Commander to spend at least six months in
residence at the Royal Naval Academy every seven years. The King is an
Admiral of the Fleet and has shown a preference for naval officers in selecting
his closest advisors.
The smallest of the military branches is the Air Force. It is currently
organized around eight squadrons of fighter jets, one squadron of patrol and
reconnaissance craft, and one squadron of heavy transport craft. The total Air
Force complement of personnel totals approximately 8000. There is usually one
Lieutenant General and four brigadiers Colonels in command of squadrons are,
however, considered the jobs-of-choice for career air force officers. The Air
Force became a separate branch only in 1964 and has prided itself in a technical
and non-political character. The King is a fighter pilot and holds the rank of an Air
Force Brigadier
In 1976 President Fire reorganized the military structure to emphasize joint
operations. The nation was carved into four military regions with a single
commander for all military forces within that region. From 1976 until 1995 Military
Regions 3 and 4 were commanded by Admirals, while Regions 1 and 2 were
commanded by Army Generals. In 1995, however, an Army General was
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appointed commander of Region 3 as a result of an increased focus on the
internal security threat of Land and Liberty.
A joint General Staff and High Command was established in 1985. After
some resistance, the joint staff has come to be seen as a prestigious and
desirable assignment. The current Chief of the General Staff is Captain-General
Henry Everett of the Esperanzan Army. General Everett was named by the King
to this role in late 1998, over the heads of several more senior Army officers. The
King makes the appointment in his role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces. The King made it clear, however, that he had consulted with the Prime
Minister and Defense Minister in making the appointment.
Since 1976 training and military doctrine have emphasized joint operations,
but many of the independent traditions of the three branches have continued.
Since 1992 civilian leadership of the military has become more assertive. Civilian
leadership of the military has also been advanced by the passing of the Cold
War, which has tended to call into question the mission of the Esperanzan
military. Participation in international peace-keeping and peace-making
operations is popular among the officer corps, but has not been well-received by
the general public. The incremental reduction of military forces, especially the
Army, began under the Mendoa government and has continued.
The Civil Guard is technically a public safety agency and reports to the
Ministry of the Interior rather than the Minister of Defense. But by tradition and
organization the Civil Guard is closely related to the armed forces. All Civil Guard
officers must be veterans of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The majority of Civil
Guard officers are former Army Officers who did not make promotion to Captain
or beyond. At the regimental command level, Civil Guard officers have a high
concentration of retired Army Majors and Colonels.
The Civil Guard consists of approximately 40,000 personnel organized
around regiments of 1000. Regiments are assigned specific geographic regions.
Within each regimental region members of the Civil Guard provide a range of
services from customs administration, immigration control, tax investigation, drug
enforcement, building inspections, highway patrol, rural law enforcement,
emergency response, and much more. The Civil Guard touches nearly every
aspect of public safety other than school crossing guards and fire control. On a
national basis the Civil Guard has been given particular responsibility for internal
security, which has included intelligence gathering and anti-terrorist operations.
During the late 1980s and 1990s, the Civil Guard responded to the threat
posed by Land and Liberty by concentrating regiments in Altair, Montaigne, and
Isle de Sol provinces. The ratio of Civil Guard personnel to general population in
these provinces is nearly twice the national average. Since 1995 the Civil Guard
has also been tightly integrated into the communications and intelligence
gathering functions of the Third Military Region, which encompasses these same
provinces. This concentration of resources, and integration with military
functions, has been controversial among civil libertarians, but appears to have
been effective in curtailing the tactical operations of Land and Liberty.
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The Civil Guard is led by a national commandant, almost always a retired
Army general officer, who reports directly to the Minister of the Interior. During
the Fire years elements of the Civil Guard became associated with ongoing
abuse of civil rights, and the institution continues to resist efforts at
thoroughgoing reform. But characterizations of the Civil Guard as simply a
rightist goon squad, ignores the extensive engagement of the institution in a vast
arena of national administration. In some ways the Civil Guard's resistance to




Esperanza is moving toward democracy but the United States has
increased its level of concern to this country because of the growing authoritarian
nature of their present government. U.S. bases located within Esperanza and
the use of the adjacent strait have been designated vital to U.S. national
interests.
The Kingdom of Esperanza has voiced its disappointment toward United
States involvement in their domestic affairs. The Kingdom of Esperanza has
publicly stated that increased U.S. involvement will lead to the closing of all U.S.
bases located within their borders and the expulsion of all U.S citizens from their
country. In addition, Esperanza claims they will deny use of the adjacent strait
between Esperanza and Aleria.
The United States' position is to support democracy throughout the world
and to ensure freedom of passage for all international waterways. The U.S.
military has been asked to prepare for any event that may include the escalation
of political-military affairs between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Esperanza. In
preparation, NAVSPACECOM has conducted an evaluation of the space system
threat to the area.
WCTA Framework Analysis
Assess Political Reality
Step 1a) Systemic War
Step 1 b) Beginning Stage





Assess required capabilities for each counterspace tactic
Step 2a) No additional capabilities added. Use of Required Capability List , as
given.
Step 2b) Weighting factors calculated for each counterspace tactic:
D&D =9/5 = 1 .80
EA = 9/4 = 2.25
GSAS =6/6 = 1 .00
ASAT =5/6= .83
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Evaluate and Assign Adversary's Attained Threat value for each
counterspace tactic
Step 3a) Intelligence reports reveal the following Esperanza capabilities, as
indicated by an "x" on the given Capability Lists.
Step 3b)
D&D = 1 .80 x 4 = 7.20
EA = 2.25 x 2 = 4.50
GSAS = 1.00x6= 6.00
ASAT = .83 x 3 = 2.49
Determine Overall Treat to Space System
Step 4a) Overarching Threat Value of Space System = 20.19
Step 4b) Final Assessment
NO (0-20) - In the judgement of the researchers, an attack against a space
































x_4 Physical Attack Assets
x_5 Any Military Assets
(include SOFs)













6 On orbit satellites
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